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Introduction 
Government spending is high in Croatia (about
50% of GDP), and so, hence, is the burden of
financing it. Over 80% of this spending is financed
from tax revenue. The tax burden is not evenly
spread, for citizens with higher incomes bear a
higher burden.
The high level of government spending is partially the
consequence of the process of the transition to a mar-
ket economy, during which the number of retired per-
sons has very considerably increased. The conse-
quences of this will neither easily nor speedily be
overcome, and the process of the ageing of the popu-
lation will additionally aggravate the problem. But to
a large extent the high government spending is the
result of society’s lack of trust in the system of market
economy to settle the basic economic problems -– the
allocation of factors in the production of goods and
services. Until economists convince the public that
leaving this role to the market is to the greatest bene-
fit of the population, it will be impossible to reduce
government spending and hence the tax burden.
In the current circumstances sporadic reductions of
the burden of any given tax, without a correspon-
ding reduction of expenditure, is only a cosmetic
solution. In the centre of attention of this paper,
then, is precisely one such case; however, it is of
interest to us primarily because the moves of the
government have not produced the proclaimed ends.
The most important change in the Income Tax Law
adopted at the end of 2004 was the increase in per-
sonal allowance, which was supposed to take some
of the tax burden off the most at risk, as they are
called, sections of the population, that is, the lowest
income groups. As you will see in this text, this did
not happen, and I shall explain why. Something did
happen, however, which was a slight reduction in
the tax burden for those taxpayers with higher
incomes. However, in conditions of growing gov-
ernment expenditure the question has to arise as to
upon whom the burden of making up the lost fiscal
revenues will fall.
Some other changes had nevertheless been hoped
for from the new law:
• Abolition of the highest marginal tax rate of 45%.
The marginal tax rate says what the percentage
of every additionally earned kuna goes off to
the government in the form of tax. If we include
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If some of the changes had been achieved in the
new Income Tax Law, it might be possible to speak
of tax reform which might lead to a higher quality
tax system. As it is, I am left with nothing but to
analyse just a case of changes introduced with an
objective that has not been achieved.
The impact of changes in the Income
Tax Law on the amount and 
distribution of the tax burden
Who are the winners and losers as a result of the
new changes in income tax? When tax is concerned,
anyone who pays is a loser. Everyone would rather
spend his money in his favourite shop or restaurant,
put it into a savings account or buy additional life
insurance than put it into the government kitty. If
you cannot, or not dare to, conceal your income
from the taxman, you must pay tax.
Whether it is just that individual A pays 100,000
kuna tax and individual B pays nothing, of this I
shall not debate here. We know that person A does
not consider it just, and person B does. And in
Croatia, as we shall see, some pay more, and some
pay less, tax. Changes in the regulations concerning
income tax usually have as their aim the achieve-
ment “of a distribution of the tax burden that is as
just as possible, and respect for the principle of
equality and equity”. Which being translated means
that some groups of the population will have to pay
contributions for mandatory insurance in the
consideration, then the highest marginal rate
comes to 62.5%. For example, if an employer
determines to increase the total monthly outlay
on an employee from 34,000 to 31,000 kuna, of
the additional 100 kuna, only 37.5 kuna will
accrue to the employee, and the rest will be
taken by the state. Nor should it be forgotten
that if the employee decides to spend this
remainder, an additional 7 or more kuna will be
taken by VAT or some other taxes. The trend
in the world is to reduce the highest rate in
income tax systems. What is more, one of the
arguments in favour of tax changes in Croatia
was to provide a spur to savings and invest-
ment. And it would be the removal of this brake
that would most encourage people to work,
save and invest more. 
• Abolition of tax breaks. Above all, these are
arbitrary and have a discriminatory effect: two
people with the same pre-tax income pay dif-
ferent amount of taxes, because one of them
has used some relief and the other has not. And
only because she has determined to spend his
income in some other way, which the law does
not favour. This phenomenon is called horizon-
tal inequity. 
A tax system should work as a means to collect
the necessary revenue. Welfare aims have to be
settled via the expenditure side of the budget.
For example, since we already have a system for
the distribution of child benefits, then it could
be expanded to cover dependent benefits too,
and the personal allowance for children and
dependents could be completely excluded from
the income tax system. 
Economic policy objectives like increases in
savings could best be achieved by a reduction of
the general level of government spending, and
not by tax breaks or, for example, subsidised
housing savings.
Until 2000, there was practically just a single
relief in the income tax system – the personal
allowance; but in 2003, we have about a score of
them.
• Different sources of income should have equal
treatment in taxation. The same tax should be
paid on a single kuna of income irrespective of
whether this income is acquired by labour, cap-
ital or property.
• Reformulation of the importance of contributions
for obligatory insurance. The systems of retire-
ment and health insurance are not insurance in
the true sense of the word. Persons A and B of
the same age and state of health will pay an
equal premium for the health insurance policy
of an insurance company. But the state health
insurance takes a “premium” that is propor-
tional to income, which means that person A
with an income that is three times the size of the
income of person B pays three times as much
for the same service. Because of this, and since
outlays are obligatory, state-run health insur-
ance is actually a tax and is in essence not any
different from the standard income tax.
Retirement insurance is slightly different,
because future pensions are, to some extent,
contributions-related, but there is still the ele-
ment of compulsion, i.e., the absence of option:
to whom would I rather trust my money?
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• the basic personal allowance rose from 1,500 to
1,600 kuna per month; 
• the factors for the personal allowance for chil-
dren, dependents and disability also changed;
• the tax rates remained the same, but the tax
brackets were altered;
• from capital income, receipts from dividends
were excluded; 
• the total amount of reliefs that can be claimed
in a single year i) for health care services, ii) for
providing for housing and iii) according to pre-
miums for voluntary retirement, additional
health care and life insurance of the character
of saving is reduced from 36,000 to 12,000 kuna.
even less tax, and some even more. The recent set
of changes of the end of 2004 that came into force
this year also had this aim. “Socially sensitive”
politicians who pass such changes are always popu-
lar in the eyes of majority of the citizens. 
What changes does the new law bring?
You can find more details about the new income
tax law in the new Income Tax Law and in every
decent magazine that deals with taxes, finances and
accounting. Here I shall mention just some of the
changes that seem most interesting for analysis:
Comparative analysis of the 
distribution of the tax burden
Do the changes tend to benefit only those taxpayers
with lower incomes, or the whole of the popula-
tion? I shall answer this question with a simulation.
According to figures concerning income, allowances
and reliefs for taxpayers in 2003, I shall calculate
how much tax would be paid according to the old
law, and how much according to the new.
But even before the simulation, we are still in the
position to answer the following question: who will
have the greatest pecuniary benefit from the
increase in the personal allowance and other tax
reliefs? The answer is:
The greatest benefit (that is, savings in the form of a
smaller amount of tax paid) from the increase in the
personal allowance and other tax benefits will accrue
to taxpayers with higher incomes.
This claim certainly requires explanation.
Personal allowances and other reliefs cannot exceed
the amount of income. The consequence of this is
that taxpayers with higher incomes can use more of
their personal allowance and other reliefs.
Let us look first of all at the procedure in which the
tax base is derived from income obtained. It is
arrived at by taking the personal allowance and
other reliefs to which the taxpayer has the right
away from the income. Thus
tax base = 
income minus personal allowance
minus other reliefs
The amount of the personal allowance and other
reliefs cannot surpass the amount of income for
then the tax base would be negative, and according
to the law this is impossible; the smallest possible
tax base is 0 kuna.
For example, a taxpayer with an annual income of
17,000 kuna can claim the allowance of at most
17,000, which means that he cannot make use of the
full personal allowance, which came in 2003 to
18,000 kuna. Furthermore, the said taxpayer does
not have any benefit at all from the introduction or
enlargement of any other reliefs (for medical costs
for example). Only if he increases his income will
he be able to make use of the additional reliefs.
In 2003 about 900,000 of the total one million retired
persons had an annual income of less than 30,600
kuna (2,550 kuna p.m.), which was what the personal
allowance for pensioners came to. About 500,000 of
the total 1.6 million taxpayers who are not retirees
had incomes of lower than 18,000 kuna, which means
that they did not use up even the basic personal
allowance. Thus about 1.4 million taxpayers, of the
total 2.6 million there were in 2003, did not use even
the basic tax relief – the basic personal allowance.
Taxpayers with high incomes can more easily spend on
the services that the Income Tax Law looks kindly
upon. Additional life, health and pensions insurance
and charitable donations are expenditures that can
be afforded by persons who have already met the
most vital of their necessities, and these are persons
with high incomes. I would not like in the slightest
to dispute the usefulness, necessity and justification
of these activities, but in the context of this analysis,
an individual with 18,000 kuna p.a. income simply
cannot set aside another 12,000 a year for addition-
al retirement insurance, for instance. It would be
something of a feat if he could set aside at least
2,000 kuna, but as we have seen, this would not help
him to reduce his tax obligations. On the other
hand, an individual with 80,000 kuna will be able to
take on several further insurance policies.
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But tax reliefs lead to discrimination. They favour
certain forms of investment over other forms, and
thus individuals who invest an equal amount of
money in different forms achieve different rates of
return, which in free market conditions would be
equal. Thus relative prices are distorted and
resources are allocated inefficiently. Also, unfair
market competition is created from those businesses
that provide products and services the consumption
of which can be acknowledged as tax reliefs, unlike
those firms whose products once bought cannot be
acknowledged as a tax offset1. Apart from that, tax
reliefs increase the administrative costs of tax collec-
tion, reduce the redistributive effect of income tax,
lead to corruption and because of all this together
decrease the efficiency of the tax system.
Before an explanation of the third reason, let us
look at how the tax liability is calculated from the
tax base. The tax base is divided into set parts, each
of which is taxed with a different rate. Fig. 1 shows
the case of a taxpayer whose monthly base is 25,000
Figure 1.  The tax base, tax brackets and tax rates in kuna
old law
0 5,000 10,000 15,000 20,000 25,000
tax base
15 %
25 %
35 %
45 %
3,000 3,750 14,250 4,000
3,200 4,800 14,400 2,600new law
1 The same effect is produced by the housing savings that are supported from the National Budget.
2 Contributions for obligatory insurance are an expenditure for all taxpayers that pay them. For taxpayers who carry out an inde-
pendent professional activity (tradesmen, freelance professions, farmers) expenditures are pecuniary outflows for the purpose of
obtaining the goods and services necessary for production. For some kinds of income (occasional freelance work, property) stan-
dardised costs calculated as a percentage of the receipts are allowed. 
The reduction of a high-earning individual’s tax base
reduces the tax liability by a greater amount than it
does for an individual with low earnings. This is a
consequence of the graduated manner of taxation
according to which fixed parts of the base are taxed
according to ascending rates: 15, 25, 35 and 45%.
Any taxpayer who gets into the 45% bracket keeps
55 lipa of every kuna of this tax base over 21,000
while 45 lipa go to the government as tax. If he can
reduce this base by 1 kuna, he will pay 45 lipa of tax
fewer. A taxpayer who is in the 15% bracket will be
able to save only 15 lipa of each 1 kuna of relief.
The same goes, analogously, for the 25 and 35%
brackets. 
The distribution of the tax burden
according to the old law and the new
The basis for the simulation was a sample of 4.4%
of the total population of income tax payers in
Croatia, of whom in 2003 there were 2.6 million.
For each taxpayer from this sample we have the
information concerning their income from various
sources and of the personal allowance claimed and
other reliefs.
Table 1 gives a summary review of the distribution
of pre-tax income and income tax and surtax in
2003. Pre-tax income is the difference between
receipts and expenses, as defined by the Income Tax
Law2. Total income from all sources came to 88.5
billion kuna. Total tax and surtax (on income tax)
came to 7.6 billion kuna. If we divide the second
amount with the first, we will obtain the annual rate
of taxation for all taxpayers of 8.5%.
kuna. The base is divided into four parts, and then
each part is taxed at the appropriate rate. The new
law increased the “25%” bracket, and the “45%”
bracket comes later – after 22,400 kuna, instead of
the previous 21,000 kuna. According to the old law,
the taxpayer would pay in kuna:
3,000 x 15 + 3,750 x 25% + 14,250 x 35%
+ 4,000 x 45% = 8,175, 
while in the new system, he will pay:
3,200 x 15% + 4,800 x 25% + 14,400 x 356%
+ 2,600 x 45% = 7,890
or 3.5% tax less.
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I arranged taxpayers in ascending order of annual
pre-tax income and put them into ten income
brackets in such a way that there is an equal num-
ber of taxpayers in each bracket. The column
income brackets shows the income intervals in which
the taxpayers from the given brackets are located.
For the creation of these income intervals, I used
monthly incomes3. Here is an example: the 10% of
the people with the lowest incomes (bracket 1) had
a monthly income of less than 500 kuna, and they
had an aggregate annual income of 714.9 million
kuna, and paid 23.5 million kuna of tax and surtax,
and so their annual tax rate came to 3.3%. On the
other hand, the 10% of the taxpayers with the high-
est incomes had an income of more than 5,600 kuna
a month, and earned 29.3 billion kuna of income, or
33.2% of all income. They paid 5 billion, or 66.5%
of all tax and surtax. For them, the average tax rate
came to 17.1%.
As income increase, the average tax rate also rises.
This is a proof of the progressivity of the income
tax: the tax relatively burdens people with higher
incomes more.
In order to be able to provide additional interesting
information, I divided the tenth bracket again into 10
equal parts. These figures are to be found in the lower
part of Table 1. The new sub-brackets are called 10-1,
10-2 and so on, and contain 1% groups of taxpayers. It
is particularly interesting that the highest class (10-10),
which consists of the 1% of all taxpayers that have the
highest incomes (with over 14,000 kuna month
income), pay 2.1 billion kuna, or 28% of all income tax
and surtax. The average tax burden is 25.9%.
Table 1. Distribution of pre-tax income and tax burden in 2003
Bracket
Size of
bracketa
Income bracketsb
(in kuna)
Total annual
income
(%)
Total annual
tax and
surtax
(%)
Average
tax rate
1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8=6:4
1 10 0 to 500 714.9 0.8 23.5 0.3 3.3
2 10 500 to 1,000 2,231.5 2.5 31.6 0.4 1.4
3 10 1,000 to 1,300 3,534.8 4.0 24.2 0.3 0.7
4 10 1,300 to 1,700 4,674.3 5.3 24.4 0.3 0.5
5 10 1,700 to 2,000 5,746.9 6.5 68.4 0.9 1.2
6 10 2,000 to 2,500 7,034.3 8.0 152.1 2.0 2.2
7 10 2,500 to 3,200 8,787.1 9.9 331.3 4.4 3.8
8 10 3,200 to 4,200 11,381.5 12.9 674.6 8.9 5.9
9 10 4,200 to 5,600 15,012.7 17.0 1,205.4 15.9 8.0
10 10 more than 5,600 29,340.7 33.2 5,022.8 66.5 17.1
Total 88,458.6 100.0 7,558.3 100.0 8.5
10-1 1 5,600 to 5,800 1,759.5 2.0 175.6 2.3 10.0
10-2 1 5,800 to 6,000 1,831.6 2.1 187.6 2.5 10.2
10-3 1 6,000 to 6,300 1,911.4 2.2 197.2 2.6 10.3
10-4 1 6,300 to 6,600 2,013.3 2.3 228.5 3.0 11.3
10-5 1 6,600 to 7,100 2,135.8 2.4 252.5 3.3 11.8
10-6 1 7,100 to 7,700 2,298.9 2.6 298.4 3.9 13.0
10-7 1 7,700 to 8,600 2,534.2 2.9 355.6 4.7 14.0
10-8 1 8,600 to 10,300 2,919.1 3.3 477.7 6.3 16.4
10-9 1 10,300 to  14,000 3,654.1 4.1 731.1 9.7 20.0
10-10 1 more than 14,000 8,172.3 9.2 2,118.7 28.0 25.9
Amounts of income and tax are in million kuna. aAs share in the total population of taxpayers, b Formed according to mean monthly income
Data source: Ministry of Finance – Tax Administration
3 For the majority, since they receive wages and pensions, mensal amounts are more readily graspable.
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Table 2 Coefficients and amounts of personal allowances according to the old and the new law*
coefficient of
personal allowance
amount of personal
allowance
change in
the amount
(%)
before now before now
1. 2. 3. 4. 5=4/3
taxpayer 1.00 1.00 18,000 19,200 6.7
taxpayer + dependent 1.40 1.50 25,200 28,800 14.3
taxpayer + dependent + partial disability 1.65 1.80 29,700 34,560 16.4
taxpayer + dependent + 100% disability 1.65 2.50 29,700 48,000 61.6
taxpayer + disabled child 1.25 1.30 22,500 24,960 10.9
taxpayer + 100% disability 1.25 2.00 22,500 38,400 70.7
taxpayer + 1 child 1.42 1.50 25,560 28,800 12.7
taxpayer + 1 child + dependent 1.82 2.00 32,760 38,400 17.2
taxpayer + 1 child + dependent+ partial disability 2.07 2.30 37,260 44,160 18.5
taxpayer + 1 child + dependent+ 100% disability 2.07 3.00 37,260 57,600 54.6
taxpayer + 1 child + partial disability 1.67 1.80 30,060 34,560 15.0
taxpayer + 1 child + 100% disability 1.67 2.50 30,060 48,000 59.7
taxpayer + 2 children 2.01 2.20 36,180 42,240 16.7
taxpayer + 2 children + dependent 2.41 2.70 43,380 51,840 19.5
taxpayer + 2 children + dependent+ partial disability 2.66 3.00 47,880 57,600 20.3
taxpayer + 2 children + dependent+ 100% disability 2.66 3.70 47,880 71,040 48.4
taxpayer + 2 children + partial disability 2.26 2.50 40,680 48,000 18.0
taxpayer + 2 children + 100% disability 2.26 3.20 40,680 61,440 51.0
taxpayer + 3 children 2.85 3.20 51,300 61,440 19.8
taxpayer + 3 children + dependent 3.25 3.70 58,500 71,040 21.4
taxpayer + 3 children + dependent+ partial disability 3.50 4.00 63,000 76,800 21.9
taxpayer + 3 children + dependent+ 100% disability 3.50 4.70 63,000 90,240 43.2
taxpayer + 3 children + partial disability 3.10 3.50 55,800 67,200 20.4
taxpayer + 3 children + 100% disability 3.10 4.20 55,800 80,640 44.5
taxpayer + 4 children 4.02 4.60 72,360 88,320 22.1
taxpayer + 4 children + dependent 4.42 5.10 79,560 97,920 23.1
taxpayer + 4 children + dependent+ partial disability 4.67 5.40 84,060 103,680 23.3
taxpayer + 4 children + dependent + 100% disability 4.67 6.10 84,060 117,120 39.3
taxpayer + 4 children + partial disability 4.27 4.90 76,860 94,080 22.4
taxpayer + 4 children + 100% disability 4.27 5.60 76,860 107,520 39.9
taxpayer in ASNC – Group 1 1.00 1.00 45,000 46,080 2.4
taxpayer in ASNC – Group 2 1.00 1.00 36,000 38,400 6.7
taxpayer in ASNC – Group 3 1.00 1.00 27,000 28,800 6.7
taxpayer in hill and mountain regions 1.00 1.00 27,000 28,800 6.7
*Author’s calculations
ASNC – areas of special national concern
Results of the simulation
I decided in the simulation to include four elements
to which the changes in the law referred: 
Bracket
Size of
bracketa
(%)
Income
bracketsb
(in kuna)
Annual
income from
capital
(million kuna)
(%)
99 less than14,000 231.0 12,8
10-10 1 more than14,000 1,568.3 87,2
The total amount that exceeds the 12,000 kuna
threshold for these 17,000 people came to no more
than about 28 million kuna. We can conclude that
the measure of limiting this relief would have a very
minor effect in 2003.
Finally, the simulation was carried out in the fol-
lowing manner: data about the personal allowance
from 2003 were transformed into the amounts that
would hold good according to the new law. Then
the tax base was calculated, and at the end, the
income tax, according to the newly defined tax
brackets. Income from dividends was excluded
from the calculation of the base. According to the
rate of surtax, the surtax too was worked out. The
whole of the simulation shows what the tax burden
would have been in 2003 if the new law (of 2005)
had been in force then.
The results are shown in Table 4, which is like
Table 1. Columns 4 and 5 contain the amounts of
annual tax and surtax per taxpayer, according to the
old and according to the new law. For example, tax-
payers from Bracket 6, who earned a monthly
income before taxation of between 2,000 and 2,500
kuna paid in the whole of 2003 an average 585 kuna
of tax and surtax. In the new law, they would pay
493 kuna, or 93 kuna less than according to the old
law. Column 6 presents the average annual savings
via the lower payment of tax, thanks to the new law.
It rises with income – from 6 kuna for the first 10%
of the taxpayers, all the way up to 13,227 kuna for
the 1% of taxpayers with the highest incomes.
Table 5 gives us the average tax rates before and
after the changes. For all the income brackets, the
average rate has been reduced, but to a much
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Table 3. Distribution of income from dividends
and shares in profit in 2003
a As percentage of the total population of taxpayers
b Formed according to the mean monthly income
• Increase of the basic personal allowance from
1,500 to 1,600 kuna p.m.
• Change in the factors of the personal allowance.
As can be seen from Table 2, the coefficients
now look more favourably on families with a
larger number of children and dependents. The
coefficients of taxpayers with 100% disabilities
have risen the most, and they actually consti-
tute a new category. To obtain the total annual
personal allowance, the coefficient of personal
allowance is multiplied by the new amount of
the basic personal allowance. Column 4 shows
the percentage changes of the amounts of per-
sonal allowance for individual categories of tax-
payer. The average unweighted growth of per-
sonal allowance is 26.4%.
• Changes in the tax brackets (see the previous
account).
• Exclusion of receipts from dividends from taxa-
tion4. Income of this kind came in 2003 to about
1.8 billion kuna. It was taxed at a rate of 15%
and brought in, together with its associated sur-
tax, about 300 million kuna. It is interesting to
observe the distribution of this income. I could
have shown it with a full table like Table 1, but
in this case it would be a needless waste of
space. For as Table 3 shows, the upper 1% of
the taxpayers with the highest incomes earned
87.2% of the total income from dividends and
profit shares. The consequence of abolishing
tax on this kind of income is equivalent to
reducing the tax burden for this group of tax-
payers.
One of the changes that I mentioned above is the
limitation of the said reliefs to a maximum amount
of 12,000 kuna p.a. Why was this relief not includ-
ed in the simulation? The reason is simple – the
effect of this change on the total distribution of the
tax burden would be negligible. One or more of
these reliefs was used by about 390,000 taxpayers.
The total amount of the reliefs claimed was 990
million kuna. However, only 17,000 taxpayers used
these reliefs in amounts more than 12,000 kuna.
4 Corporate profit (at company level) is taxed with profit tax, the rate of which comes to 20%. From 2001 to 2004 we had the case
of double taxation, because on dividends paid out, income tax (at individual level) was also levied.
greater extent for the top 1% of taxpayers (from
25.9 to 21.7%, or by 4.2 percentage points).
At the end we wonder if the system has become
more progressive than it was before. The answer
can be obtained by comparing the shares in the
totally paid tax and surtax. According to the old law
(Table 5, column 6) and the new law (column 7).
The proportion of the total tax and surtax paid by
the 9th and 10th brackets5 has slightly risen, has
reduced for brackets from 5 to 8, and has remained
the same for brackets 1 to 4. According to this we
can conclude that income tax is slightly more pro-
gressive than it was before the changes in the
statute.
Conclusion
The income tax burden in Croatia is not evenly
spread. Thanks to the personal allowance system,
half of the taxpayers practically do not actually pay
tax at all. On the other hand, the 10% of the tax-
payers with the highest incomes bear two thirds of
the tax burden. The average tax rate rises with
income, which means that the tax is progressive.
Using data concerning the incomes of income tax
payers in 2003, we calculated how much income tax
and surtax they would pay according to the provi-
sions of the new law. Changes in the Income Tax
Law that have been enforced since the beginning of
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Bracket
Size of
bracketa
(%)
Income bracketsb
(in kuna)
Annual tax and
surtax per taxpayer
(old law)
Annual tax and
surtax per taxpayer
(new law)
Difference 
1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6=5–4
1 10 0 to 500 90 84 –6
2 10 500 to 1,000 122 113 –9
3 10 1,000 to 1,300 93 86 –7
4 10 1,300 to 1,700 94 73 –21
5 10 1,700 to 2,000 263 208 –55
6 10 2,000 to 2,500 585 493 –92
7 10 2,500 to 3,200 1,275 1,056 –219
8 10 3,200 to 4,200 2,597 2,228 –369
9 10 4,200 to 5,600 4,640 4,115 –525
10 10 more than 5,600 19,335 16,913 –2,422
Total: 2,910 2,537 –373
10-1 1 5,600 to 5,800 6,759 6,041 –718
10-2 1 5,800 to 6,000 7,220 6,485 –735
10-3 1 6,000 to 6,300 7,592 6,794 –798
10-4 1 6,300 to 6,600 8,794 7,916 –878
10-5 1 6,600 to 7,100 9,719 8,733 –986
10-6 1 7,100 to 7,700 11,488 10,480 –1,008
10-7 1 7,700 to 8,600 13,691 12,569 –1,122
10-8 1 8,600 to 10,300 18,388 16,653 –1,735
10-9 1 10,300 to 14,000 28,143 25,123 –3,020
10-10 1 more than 14,000 81,560 68,333 –13,227
Table 4.  Results of the simulation: changes in the tax burden as a result of the new law
a As percentage of the total population of taxpayers  
b Formed according to mean monthly income
5 This goes for the 10th bracket as a whole, but since we additional divided it, we can note one exception: the percentage of the
whole of the tax paid by the highest earning 1% of taxpayers was reduced from 28 to 26.9.
2005 had as one of their aims to achieve a “more
equitable” distribution of the tax burden, and this
meant to achieve still greater progressivity. As our
analysis as shown, this has actually occurred, to a
slight extent, as a result of the increase of the pro-
portion of the total tax paid by the 20% of taxpay-
ers with the highest pre-tax incomes.
Taxpayers with higher incomes will have greater
savings (in the shape of smaller tax payments) from
the increase in the personal allowance. They will
make further savings as a result of the abolition of
the taxation of income from dividends and profit
shares. The savings of taxpayers with lower incomes
is actually inconsiderable.
One more conclusion inevitably comes to mind:
the increase of the personal allowance cannot be a
measure to increase the standard of living of indi-
viduals with low incomes, because their income is
actually lower than the personal allowance. The
result of the increase of the personal allowance is a
reduction of the liabilities of all the other taxpay-
ers.
Since the expenses of the government are not
falling, but rise year by year, a reduction of poten-
tial revenue from income tax as a result of changes
in the legislation will have to be made up by an
increase in some other fiscal revenues.
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Bracket
Size of
bracketa
(%) 
Income bracketsb
(in kuna)
Average tax rate 
(old law)
Average tax rate
(old law)
Percentage in
total tax
(old law)
Percentage in
total tax
(new law)
1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7.
1 10 0 to 500 3.3 3.1 0.3 0.3
2 10 500 to 1,000 1.4 1.3 0.4 0.4
3 10 1,000 to 1,300 0.7 0.6 0.3 0.3
4 10 1,300 to 1,700 0.5 0.4 0.3 0.3
5 10 1,700 to 2,000 1.2 0.9 0.9 0.8
6 10 2,000 to 2,500 2.2 1.8 2.0 1.9
7 10 2,500 to 3,200 3.8 3.1 4.4 4.2
8 10 3,200 to 4,200 5.9 5.1 8.9 8.8
9 10 4,200 to 5,600 8.0 7.1 15.9 16.2
10 10 more than 5,600 17.1 15.0 66.5 66.7
Total: 8.5 7.4 100.0 100.0
10-1 1 5,600 to 5,800 10.0 8.9 2.3 2.4
10-2 1 5,800 to 6,000 10.2 9.2 2.5 2.6
10-3 1 6,000 to 6,300 10.3 9.2 2.6 2.7
10-4 1 6,300 to 6,600 11.3 10.2 3.0 3.1
10-5 1 6,600 to 7,100 11.8 10.6 3.3 3.4
10-6 1 7,100 to 7,700 13.0 11.8 3.9 4.1
10-7 1 7,700 to 8,600 14.0 12.9 4.7 5.0
10-8 1 8,600 to 10,300 16.4 14.8 6.3 6.6
10-9 1 10,300 to 14,000 20.0 17.9 9.7 9.9
10-10 1 more than 14,000 25.9 21.7 28.0 26.9
Table 5.  Results of the simulation: average tax rate and distribution of the tax burden
a As percentage of total population of taxpayers.  
b Formed according to average monthly income
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